Christians and The Bible in the Quran

This article looks to introduce the concept of Christians and the Bible in the Qur’an by analysing the historical and textual sources. The references included at the end of the article are a wealth of information and a requirement for anyone interested in inter-faith.

The Theology of Revelation

{So [you believers], say, ‘We believe in God and in what was sent down to us and what was sent down to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, and what was given to Moses, Jesus, and all the prophets by their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them, and we devote ourselves to Him} [2:136]

According to the Qur’an it is the final chapter in the historic narrative of the Divine Revelation to humanity. A revelation recorded on a symbolic {Preserved Tablet} [85:22] that is {the source of all Scripture (Umm al-kitāb)} [13:39] repeatedly revealed and taught to man through His Messengers and Prophets. Tradition suggests some ‘124,000 Prophets of which 315 were messengers’ (Ahmad) brought the same message of Divine Unity (tawHīd): {We never sent any messenger before you [Muhammad] without revealing to him: ‘There is no god but Me, so serve Me.’} [21:25] to different places and in different languages {We have never sent a messenger who did not use his own people’s language to make things clear for them} [14:4]. Each new chapter of revelation is the same in meaning, but different in form; the Prophet is reported to have said: “The prophets are half-brothers; their mothers differ, and their religion (dīn) is one” [Bukhari]. The Qur’anic vision has a distinctly pluralistic trend confirming other revelations and even, it might be said, other religions: “We have assigned a law and a path to each of you. If God had so willed, He would have made you one community, but He wanted to test you through that which He has given you, so race to do good” [5:48] (#4).

Historical analysis of Christians

Evidence of a Christian presence on the peripheries of 7^th century Arabia is well established, but fragments of sources suggest a presence even in Arabia proper and the Hijaz.

North West – Syria: St. Paul said: “I went off to Arabia” (Gal 1:17), most likely the territories controlled by the Nabateans, which were incorporated into the Roman Empire as the Province of Arabia in 106CE. The Christian communities had grown so numerous that there were five representatives at the council of Nicea, 325CE. The churches in this Arab milieu had strong ties with the Syriac-speaking churches in Mesopotamia, especially Melkite Edessa. The Ghassānids became the principal group of Arab tribes allied to Byzantium on the Arabian frontier in the sixth century (#2). As for the Ghassānids’ territories, recent archaeological excavations have revealed extensive church and monastery buildings. Many of these installations include beautiful mosaics, some with Greek inscriptions, testifying to material and cultural wealth. (#7)

North East – Iraq and The Persian Gulf: The Lakhmid territories under Persian influence, in the lower Euphrates, were Syriac speakers allied to the Nestorian ‘Assyrian Church of the East’ (#2). The church had flourished in the area and archaeological investigations on the coast of southern Arabia especially along the Persian Gulf have uncovered a number of sites with extensive church remains typical of the Nestorians, particularly in the territory of modern Kuwait (#7).

South West – Ethiopia, Red Sea and Najrān: A strong Ethiopian or Abyssinian Monophsite Christian presence had been established to the West and South of Arabia, through military expedition and trade, for some time prior to revelation. The Abyssinian Negus had come to the aid of the Najrān (in the South) in 520CE, probably at the behest of the Byzantines, to liberate persecuted Christians from the Himyarite king (#2). A bustling community grew out of the shrine of the ‘Najrān Martyrs’, the Church of San’ā’ becoming a spiritual magnet rivalling even that of the Ka’bah. The viceroy to the Negus, Abraha, even tried to monopolise the pilgrims and invade Mekkah in 570CE – the year of the Prophet’s birth – in retaliation for some Mekkan vandalism. The Qur’an preserves the story of this ill-fated military expedition in the chapter ‘The Elephant’ (105). The Ethiopians became scattered throughout Arabia following Persian occupation at Abraha’s demise, one such community forming the Mekkan AHābish tribe (#1)

The movement of monks, traders and caravans from all these areas into central Arabia was unhindered as was the seasonal movement of the nomadic Arabs from the heart of the desert to the pastures on the periphery. These were the traditional routes of Christianity's spread eastward and southward from the beginning. By the time of Muhammad's birth, there is every reason to think that Christianity would have been well known, if not widely practiced, in the very heart of Arabia (#7).

Qur’anic Christians

Christians are referred to, not by the direct translation MasīHiyyūn, but either ahul-kitāb (people of the book) collectively with the Jews or NaSāra most likely from the Syriac version of ‘Nazarene’ (Acts 24.5) meaning ‘of Nazareth’. The term NaSāra appears in pre-Islamic poetry and Syriac Christians were known as the Nașrāyê and this spread into parts of the Eastern Roman Empire, such that this was how the Christians became exclusively known there (#3). There are numerous other instances in the Qurʾān in which the Arabic religious vocabulary used is of Greek origin through Syriac or Ethiopic (#1). Injīl (Gospel) for example, is of non-Arabic origin deriving from the Greek ‘evangelion’ (good news) most likely through Ethiopic ‘wangēl’. Other Ethiopic words can be found, familiar to the Christians, such as Hawāriyyūn (disciples). Isā (Jesus), likewise, is not an Arabised version of the Hebrew Yashū’, but rather Greek Iēsous, most likely from Syriac (#11).
Arabic translations of the Bible date from the 9^th century, although a Monophysite scholar Johannes is said to have completed a translation by the mid-7^th century; there are some suggestions incomplete translations existed before then. At that time, Christian teaching was orally from Syriac and Ethiopic translations of the Greek text, and it is in this linguistic heritage, the language in which Christianity first established itself in Arabia, that Christians are addressed. Furthermore, contemporary ecclesiastical language is from this same Greek tradition (#5, see chapter 1).

Arabia was long known as a breeding ground for heresies (Arabia haeresium ferax), which is perhaps implied by {those who say, ‘We are Christians,’ but they too forgot some of what they were told to remember, so We stirred up enmity and hatred among them} [5:14], but the target audience of the Qur’an appears primarily to be the Melkite, Nestorian and Monophysite congregations readily found in and around Arabia as mentioned above (#5, see chapter 1) and so therefore what we might think of as 'normative' Christianity today.  There is no evidence of Judeo-Christian Ebionites, that observed the Mosaic Law, surviving the 4^th century, a sect some Muslims have claimed the Qur'an reserves praise for exclusively. The Injīl too, then might be seen to be what those Christian groups understood as the Gospel.

The Gospel (Injīl)

{Step by step, He has sent the Scripture down to you [Prophet] with the Truth, confirming what went before: He sent down the Torah (Tawrāh) and the Gospel (Injīl) earlier as a guide for people and He has sent down the distinction (fur’qān)} [3:3-4]

The Tawrāh usually refers to the five books of Moses and the Injīl – singular, never plural – to the Gospels, but whether they are identical to the modern Pentateuch and New Testament is debated. Due to the singular use, the Qur'an may in fact be referencing The Diatessaron (150-175CE); a single text that harmonised the Gospels, written in Syriac and normative amongst Syriac speaking Christians (#5 pg 155).  There is no Qur’anic suggestion the Injīl {sent down} [3:3] and {taught} [3:48] to Jesus was different to the Canonical Gospels {that is with them} [7:157], so one conclusion might be that the Gospels are the same {Gospel with guidance and light} [5:46] that Christians possess and are exhorted as the {followers of the Gospel} to {judge according to what God has sent down in it} [5:47]. It may be argued, however, that Jesus as {a messenger from God} would therefore be {reciting out pages [blessed with] purity} [98:2] and so the Injīl is in reference to a revealed book, that is mentioned in some apocryphal epistles or the theoretical “Q source” that now only partially remains in the extant Gospels.  The Injīl, however, may not be like the Qur’an; rather than direct revelation through Gabriel it is the Divinely inspired message of the good news brought by Jesus. Christian monks are praised for their monasticism that {was something they invented} rather than prescribed, simply they wished {only to seek God’s pleasure} [57:27] and so were sanctioned and guided to virtue. This indirect process of guidance would conform to how Christians themselves understand the notion of the Gospel; the truths and commands of the Injīl given to Jesus are communicated to Christians through {that which they had with them} and {what was before} [2:89] the Qur’an. The Injīl then, could be considered to include both the text and the tradition around the text that conveys Jesus’ original message (#4, see 3:3-4).

Irrespective of how the Injīl is understood, the New Testament must be understood as preserving at least ‘some’ Divine revelation and so forms part of the authoritative texts of Islam.

Fur’qān

{This is a true promise given by Him in the Torah, the Gospel, and the Quran. Who could be more faithful to his promise than God?} [9:111]. The Torah, Gospel and Qur’an are seen as a sacred succession; not outdated but still giving guidance and light to mankind. The Qur’an seen here as {confirming what they already have} [2:91]. The Qur’an alludes, comments and re-tells Biblical stories rather than quotes, suggesting an assumed familiarity with the Bible, such that the Qur’an can be said as using the Bible as a subtext (#6): {you [people] can ask those who have knowledge if you do not know} [16:43], many commentators, such as Qurtubī, Tabarī, Tabrisī and Zamakhsharī (#4) understood ‘those who know’ as Christians and Jews.

The Qur’an is often identified as the fur’qān or discernment by commentators; distinguishing between the correct and incorrect interpretations of previous scripture {He has sent down the distinction (fur’qān)} [3:4]. However, the fur’qān may also be understood more in the general sense of wisdom {We gave Moses the Scripture, and the means to distinguish (fur’qān)} [2:53] especially as an attribute of prophethood. {We sent to you [Muhammad] the Scripture with the truth, confirming the Scriptures that came before it, and with final authority over them: so judge between them according to what God has sent down. Do not follow their whims, which deviate from the truth that has come to you} [5:48].

The Qur’an then could be understood as a confirmer, clarifier and protector of earlier revelations, and not so much an abrogator. Early Qur'anic commentaries, such as Tabarī, were once replete with Biblical references, which is a tradition that should be revived in order to fully understand the Qur'an.

Taḥrīf

In the first centuries of Islam, TaHrīf (falsification) was not a central theme, though well-known. Muslim authors understood the falsification as either TaHrīf al-maʿnā, distortion of the meaning of the text, or TaHrīf al-naSS, falsification of the text itself. Many scholars, such as Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406CE) rejected the latter: “since custom prevents people who have a (revealed) religion from dealing with their divine Scripture in such a manner”. Since Ibn Hazm’s writings (d. 1012CE), in a period of turbulent Christian-Muslim relations, it has become commonplace for Muslims to view the Christian scriptures as textually corrupted (#8), which as M. Watt laments: ‘the net result of all his [ibn Hazm’s] study and writing was not a better understanding of Christianity, but a strengthening of the very inadequate perception of Christianity,’ (#12, pg 91). Despite Ibn Hazm's polemical intent, he is generally credited with initiating the academic field of Biblical criticism.

The polemical TaHrīf al-naSS is highly unsatisfactory since there are all sorts of unanswered questions, such as: which parts of the text are corrupted? When did this take place? Why did the Qur’an give no details? Why is there no historical evidence the Bible has been altered? And logically such a claim is impractical: “it was not practicable thus to corrupt the text, because those Scriptures were generally known and widely circulated” (Al Razi d. 925CE). Such a claim makes the verses mentioned above nonsensical, especially the implication of scripture being protected 5:48 or incorruptible: {No one can change His words} [6:115]. Wahb bin Munabbih (d. c.730CE) argued, "The Tawrāh and the Injīl remain as God revealed them, and no letter in them was removed. However, the people misguide others by addition and false interpretation, relying on books that they wrote themselves." The Qur’an’s criticism of Christians are extra-textural theological interpretations, such that TaHrīf al-maʿnā is the only plausible understanding. Those from among the people of the book have reportedly: twisted words [3:78] and [2:75], hidden scripture [5:15], distorted meanings [4:46] and forgotten parts [5:13], substituted words [2:59], and took holy men as lords [9:31], which is understood as priests making lawful what God has made unlawful and vice-versa (Jalalayn). None of these verses can easily be understood as textual corruption. However, it is likely there is some criticism of the compilation of the canonical texts, since something has been lost [5:14] and the authors may have included commentary that is incongruous to the original message (see below).

{Jesus, son of Mary, said, ‘Children of Israel, I am sent to you by God, confirming the Torah that came before me and bringing good news of a messenger to follow me whose name will be Ahmad.’} [61:6] from 740CE have linked this verse to John 14:16 {and he shall give you another Comforter (paraclete)}. It has been suggested that AHmad (lit. praised) is the translation of periklutos “celebrated”, which was corrupted to paraklētos “comforter”. But the argument comes from the Aramaic menaHHemānā, which based on the assonance was linked to Muhammad; although plausible from a Semitic language it is impossible in Greek (#13). In fact, AHmad was not understood as a proper name, an abbreviation of Muhammad, until linked to the paraclete, but originally as an adjective; ‘ismuhu aHmadu’ meaning ‘his name is praised’.

Historical research has shown that the New Testament was recorded word-for-word as standard by the time of the Byzantines. However earlier than this, the various anonymous scribes that labourisly made copies, sometimes interpreted the text as they copied it; tidying some more ambiguous verses to make them more explicitly theologically sound as a response to Christological controversies at the time (#16). One such example might be {Thus he declared all foods clean} [Mark 7:19], which appears to be a summary statement by a commentator that misunderstood Jesus' figurative {Because it [food] enters not into his heart} indicating that the true cause of uncleanliness was not external but internal sinfulness (#17). The commentary is in direct contradiction to Jesus' emphatic statement {It is easier for heaven and earth to pass, away than for one stroke of a letter in the law to be dropped} [Luke 16:17] (also see Matt. 5:17-18 and Paul's apparent observance of dietary law Acts 10:14). How much of this 'tidying' remains in the extant texts or whether it simply influenced the formation of what became orthodoxy is less clear, but the meaning of the original message is still discernible from The New Testament

Qur’anic Criticisms

Whilst the Qur’an is respectful of the ahul-kitāb (people of the book) it does not go as far as calling them believers (it does not deny this either) and employs a ‘corrective polemic’ toward certain beliefs, such as the use of ‘Isa bin Maryam’ (Jesus son of Mary) to correct ‘the Son of God’ and stress Jesus’ humanness (#5). Verses that are positive to Christians use NaSāra - which itself could be viewed as corrective redirection away from Christ as Divine given the Qur’an’s Christology - whereas ahul-kitab is used when critical.

Commentators link {God is the third of three} [5:73] and {‘Jesus, son of Mary, did you say to people, “Take me and my mother as two gods alongside God”?’} [5:116] to imply Mary is believed to be part of the Trinity; God, Mary and Jesus. Non-Muslims criticise the Qur’an as mistaken, and some Muslims, likewise, are mistaken of Christian beliefs. Some have claimed the Qur’anic view of the Trinity is in reference to the heretical Collyridians who, flourished in 5^th century Arabia, known to have worshipped Mary as a goddess (#15), but this is pure speculation. It is most likely, given the Qur’an’s direct address to the contemporary Christians, that ‘third of three’ is in reference to Jesus’ Syriac epithet: tlîthāyâ ‘one of three’ (#5). It can be clearly shown that 5:116 is simply exonerating Jesus and Mary from any wrong doing rather than in any reference to the Trinity even without acknowledging the epithet, but it is likely that this verse refers to an intra-Christian debate.  Monophysite used the title theotokos ‘Mother of God’ for Mary since it affirmed the divinity of Jesus consubstantial Son of God the Father, but this was rejected by the Nestorians for much the same reason as the Qur’an; theotokos is an exaggeration of Jesus’s human mother. The Qur’an is resolving a church-dividing controversy that was significant at the time.

It is beyond the scope of this post to discuss each criticism (see future posts), but they are an important area of dialogue for Christians-Muslim relations, sometimes they are denied, seen as antagonistic or are met with apologetics rather than an area for further reflection.

Conclusion

The article has shown that the normative Christians are addressed in the Qur’an, rather than an extinct Judeo-Christian or heretical sect, both the positive and the negative verses. The New Testament may not contain the entire revelation of Jesus or perhaps only the Gospels are recognised, but whatever was recorded of the message remains so: alluded to, confirmed, augmented and preserved by the Qur’an. Not all Christian beliefs and practices are accepted in the Qur’an, not so much because they’re un-Islamic, rather they’re claimed as un-Christian: {Say, ‘People of the Book, you have no true basis [for your religion] unless you uphold the Torah, the Gospel, and that which has been sent down to you from your Lord,’} [5:68]. Both Jews, Christians and Muslims are redirected to the Bible as a shared source of truth and guidance.

Islam has an undeniably pluralistic layer, but is often believed by Muslims to be superior and abrogate other religions. {If anyone seeks a religion other than ‘islām’, it will not be accepted from him} [3:85] and {Today I have perfected your religion for you, completed My blessing upon you, and chosen as your religion ‘islām’} [5:3] are understood to refer specifically to Islam as the formal religion. However, the Qur’anic use of ‘al-islām’ can be argued to generally mean ‘total devotion’ (#14). In this sense ‘al-islām’ is not a religion vying to establish a cultural and ritualistic hegemony, but rather the religion of man that transcends form for the total devotion to God: {Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind} [Matt. 22:37].

References

#1 The Encounters of Eastern Christians with Early Islam, 2006, D. Thomas (edit.) et al, Brill. Note: particularly chapter 1 ‘Islam and Oriens Christianus’ by Irfan Shahīd.

#2 Arabia and the Arabs, 2001, R.G. Hoyland, Routledge. Note: particularly the section ‘The Byzantine/Sasanian period (c. AD 240 – 630)’ in chapter 2 South Arabia.

#3 Jesus in the Qur’an, 2013, G. Parrinder, One World Publications. Note: especially chapters 15 and 16.

#4 The Study Qur’an, 2015, S.H. Nasr (edit.), Harper One.

#5 The Bible in Arabic, 2013, S. Griffiths, Princeton University Press.

#6 The Qur’an and its Biblical subtext, 2012, G.S. Reynolds, Routledge.

#7 Brill online reference works – Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān: Christians and Christianity

#8 Brill online reference works – Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second edition: Taḥrīf

#9 Islamic Interpretations of Christianity, 2001, L Ridgeon, Routledge. Note: especially chapter 1 ‘Christianity in the Qur’an’

#10 Early Muslim-Christian Dialogue, 2005, M.A. Sirry, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 16:4, 361-376

#11 Brill online reference works – Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān: Jesus

#12 Muslim-Christian Encounters: Perceptions and Misperceptions, 1991, W.M. Watt, Routledge.

#13 Brill online reference works – Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān: Ahmed

#14 Arabic-English Dictionary Qur’anic Usage, 2008, E.M Badawi and M.A. Haleem, Brill

#15 Heresy, 2009, A. McGrath, Harper-Collins 

#16 The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture, 2011, B.D. Ehrman, Oxford University Press

#17 Christians Beginnings: from Nazareth to Nicea, AD30 - 325, G.Vermes, 2013, Penguin

Ramadan Lunacy

Ramadan and Eid cause a lot of confusion for Muslims and non-Muslims alike in the UK, owing to the different days that Muslims celebrate them on.  It is not the first time that religious festivals have been celebrated on different days in Britain; until the Synod of Whitby in 664 CE, the English celebrated Easter on different days.  The following article summaries the evidences and scholarly debates as to why Muslims celebrate religious festivals on different days.

Lunar months

Solar calendars are used to predict the regular pattern of the seasons when it is best to sow crops. Lunar calendars are used to predict the tides of the sea.  Most societies have created calendars to try and synthesise the two, however they are impossible to harmonise.  The moon, from which the English word month derives, is not constant in its orbit and completes its cycle between 29.2 days and 29.8 days; a lunar year lasts around 354 days and falls short, by approximately 11 days, of the solar calendar.  Pre-Islamic Arabs used a relatively complex system using calculations and sighting so that they could plan solar festivals and control the length of sacred months for fighting purposes.  There is unanimous agreement amongst Muslims that this form of manipulation is prohibited for religious months such as Ramadan and Hajj (it is of course permissible for non religious events); the Islamic religious calendar is purely lunar and determined by the sighting of the crescent moon in compliance with the Qur'anic injunctions:

{They ask you [Prophet] about crescent moons. Say, ‘They show the times appointed for people, and for the pilgrimage.’} [2:189]

{God decrees that there are twelve months- ordained in God’s Book on the Day when He created the heavens and earth- four months of which are sacred: this is the correct calculation.} [9:36]

{It is He who made the sun a shining radiance and the moon a light, determining phases for it so that you might know the number of years and how to calculate time.} [10:5]

Sighting the moon

The celestial bodies are natural signs, which synchronise our lives to the rhythm of God's universe, it is highly praiseworthy to look for the moon each month:

"The best of God's servants are those who watch the sun, moon, stars and shadows in order to remember God." (Hakim)

The month of Ramadan, as with all religious months, lasts either 29 or 30 days; it is specifically mentioned in a mass-transmitted (mutawatir) hadith that the crescent moon determines its start and finish:

"Observe the fast on sighting it (the new moon) and break (fast) on sighting it (the new moon), but if the sky is cloudy for you, then complete the number (of thirty)." (Muslim)

Witnesses

Scholars unanimously agree that it is acceptable to determine months by the testimony of another, it is not necessary to personally observe the crescent although it is a communal obligation that some in the community try to seek the crescent each month.

"Two bedouins came and witnessed before the Prophet (pbuh) swearing by God that they had sighted moon the previous evening. So the Messenger of God (pbuh) commanded the people to break the fast." (Abu Dawud)

 

Another report indicates one witness is sufficient (Abu Dawud), although there is no definitive stipulation for the number of witnesses from the texts.  Some scholars said the narrations merely show permissiblity and so one is the minimum required; others doubted the authenticity of the latter narration and drew an analogy with other legal claims that two witnesses are required. Others synthesised the two reports and said one witness is required to commence fasting, but two are required to stop fasting because only this is like other legal claims since testifying may serve a claimant's self interests.

Local or Global fasts

The command of the Prophet (pbuh): "observe the fast on sighting it" (sumu li ru’yatihi) unequivocally states that Muslims are obligated to fast when the crescent is witnessed, but there is ambiguity as to whether it applies to a single community or to all Muslims collectively.

Some scholars argued that a sighting in one region is not incumbent on another since the sky is different in each region, just as the position of the sun for, say, 'asr (mid afternoon prayer) in one region does not obligate others thousands of miles away to also pray 'asr since the sun in their sky is not in the mid afternoon position. A narration from one of the companions would concur with this reasoning, he said: "The moon of Ramadan appeared while I was in Syria. We sighted the moon on the night of Friday. When I came to Median towards the end of the month (of Ramadan), Ibn 'Abbas asked me about the moon. He said: When did you sight the moon ? I said: I sighted it on the night of Friday. He asked: Did you sight it yourself ? I said: Yes, and the people sighted it. They fasted and Mu'awiyah also fasted. He said: But we sighted it on the night of saturday. Since then we have been fasting until we complete thirty days or we sight it. Then I said: Are the sighting of the moon by Mu'awiyah and his fasts not sufficient for us? He replied: No. The Messenger of God (pbuh) commanded us to do so." (Abu Dawud). Scholars differed as to what are classed as separate regions.

 

Others scholars disagreed and said it is religiously more precautionary to go with a global sighting since the generality of the Prophet's (pbuh) direct command to fast (sumu) implies all Muslims since there is no qualification and this as a form of evidence is more authoritative than the practice of a companion.

Calculations

Physical sighting of the moon is agreed as the method of starting and completing the months in the Islamic calendar since the sacred texts are unambiguous on this point.  Some scholars allowed the use of astronomical calculations should the crescent be obscured on the 29th day.  The reason scholars have allowed it is based on the narration:

"When you see the new moon, observe fast, and when you see it (again) then break it, and if the sky is cloudy for you, then calculate it (fa qduruu lahu)." (Muslim)

Most scholars interpreted the ambiguity of 'fa qduruu lahu' as meaning complete 30 days as implied in the hadith above; the detail of one clarifies the ambiguity of the other.  However, a minority understood the hadiths were directed towards two different groups; calculate it to those skilled in astronomy and complete 30 to those that were not.  Certainty is what starts and finishes the month, therefore if one has certainty that the moon could be sighted, even though it has not been seen, a calculation can be considered as equivalent.  Calculations are never favoured over sighting, however, since the hadith are clear that calculations are conditional on there being an obstruction in the sky.

Concluding remarks

Muslims agree on a lunar calendar that starts and finishes with the physical sighting of the new moon.  There is legitimate difference as to whether a sighting is valid globally or merely regionally.  It is not peculiar to modern times for Muslims to fast and celebrate Eid on different days.  Improved communication may exacerbate the problem as people may be confused as to why their community is not celebrating Eid when a different region on the TV is celebrating it. Muslims may benefit from agreeing a United Islamic Calendar (see moonsighting.com) to avoid confusion in our rapidly shrinking global village. God know best.

Example, Eid al Fitr 2015/1436
(maps care of moonsighting.com)

The moon was reliably sighted in Chile on Thursday sunset therefore many Muslims in the UK, using the opinion of global sightings, celebrated Eid from then through til Friday sunset - Islamic days lasting from sun down to sun down.

However, those that used regional sightings waited until the following sunset for the moon to be sighted in Morocco - the closest Muslims country on the same longitude and considered the same region - celebrating Eid from Friday sunset until Saturday sunset.

A small number of Muslims that rely purely on local sightings in their immediate location had to wait until Saturday sunset to be able to see the moon and so celebrated Eid from then until Sunday sunset.  This group of Muslims would also have started fasting later than others due to their method of sighting the moon; a lunar month can never be less than 29 days or more than 30 days.

All of the above are completely valid methods of identifying the time in Islamic Law and so all should be recognised as such.  Unity does not mean celebrating Eid on the same day, but accepting and respecting valid difference.  Differences in Eid are common in the UK since there is no official Muslim organisation to favour one method over another, whereas in Morocco, for example, everyone celebrates Eid on the same day since the religious officials agree on a preferred method.

The only confusing, and invalid, position by some in the UK is to blindly follow Saudi Arabia.  Saudi celebrated Eid from Thursday sunset until Friday sunset based on a witness in Saudi; this claim, as evident from the map, is impossible! There would be no harm for Saudi to declare Eid based on a sighting from South America, but they claimed a local sighting.  Many Muslims in the UK watching TV - many tune in to Saudi since it contains the holy cites of Mekkah and Medinah - follow Saudi.  Whilst, in principle, following Saudi is acceptable it is not acceptable to follow false claims.  This is not the first year that Saudi officials have been wrong, they have consistently proven untrustworthy either deliberately or by mistake.  Therefore, should the administration continue in its current form, Saudi should not be followed when in contradiction of Islamic Law.  Perhaps Saudi have fallen into the error of previous nations and tried to sythesise a solar calendar with a lunar one, since they use an 'Islamic Calendar' for official business and not a Gregorian one like the rest of the World.

Further Reading

https://www.zaytuna.edu/download.php?f=sample_pages.pdf

ISIS; Burning with Hypocrisy

Introduction

The World was shocked at the "viciousness and barbarity" (President Obama) glorified in the video showing Lt. Muath al-Kaseasbeh, a Jordanian Pilot, being burnt to death in a cage by ISIS (03/02/15). Muslim scholars and leaders unanimously condemned the act, including even the extremist terrorist organisation Al Qaeda (see here).  As a defence ISIS’s al Eftaawa al-Buhuth released a document to justify their actions, which reads:

' 

“Question: What is the ruling on burning the unbeliever with fire until he dies?Answer: The Hanafis and Shafi’i’s have permitted it, considering the saying of the Prophet ‘fire is only administered by God’ as an affirmation of humility.  Al Muhallab said: ‘this is not an absolute prohibition, but rather on the path of humility.’Al Hafiz ibn Hajar said: “what points to the permissibility of burning is the deeds of the Companions, and the Prophet put out the eyes of the Uraynians with heated iron while Khalid ibn al Waleed burnt people of those who apostatized.”And some of the people of knowledge have been of the opinion that burning with fire was prohibited originally, but then on retaliation it is permitted, just as the Prophet did to the people of Urayna, when he put out the eyes of the Uraynians with fire in retaliation – as is related in reliable traditions, and this brought forth the words together among the proofs.”

This article looks at each justification given and the video itself to show not only that ISIS contradicts Islamic Law and Islam generally, but ISIS’s greatest enemy to their tyranny is Islam itself!

Authority of evidence and Islamic Criminal Law

Before looking in detail at each point, some of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence needs to be identified.

The agreed upon primary sources of Islamic law are the Qur’an, Sunnah (Prophetic example), qiyas (Analogical reasoning) and ijma’ (scholarly consensus), there are other secondary evidences for which scholars differ in the extent of their use, such as Ihstihsan (equity/fairness) and maslahah mursalah (public interest).  The Companions and their followers differed as to how the evidences interact and so different approaches to interpretation formed as specific schools, of which four Sunni Schools remain in use today: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali.

Sunnah (lit. clear path) is the Prophetic example and technically means all that is narrated from the Prophet, his acts, his sayings and whatever he tacitly approved. Hadith (narration), which are sometimes incorrectly considered synonymous with Sunnah, differ in that a hadith is a recorded narration for which the Sunnah can be derived i.e. by themselves in isolation a hadith is not Sunnah but rather make up a collective body which are compared and contrasted to derive the Sunnah.  Khabar (lit. news or report) normally refer to legal precedents set by the companions; as those closest to the Prophet, their teaching and practice are also a source of Sunnah. All narrations consist of an isnad (chain of transmission) and a matn (text), both of these are analysed for authenticity and legal implication.  Hadith from the Prophet take precedence over the companions of the Prophet, such as the four Caliphs (successors), just as they in turn take precedence over other companions, similarly verbal commands of the Prophet take precedent over his actions.

Ahad (single) narrations are those that come through one chain of transmission (isnad) and differ to mutawatir (mass transmitted) or mashhur (wide spread) narrations, which come from multiple sources.  Generally ahad reports are not authoritative by themselves since they are speculative and are only accepted if corroborated by other sources since two witnesses (2:282) are required as proof in Islamic Law. In addition the guiding principle of Islamic Law is the maxim: ‘Certainty is not lifted by doubt’ (see also 49:6 and 53:28) not only in deriving law but in proving crimes.

All criminal acts are dealt with through the due process of law in a court with careful scrutiny of the evidence by one or many official judges (qadi).  There are two types of punishment in Islamic Law: hadd and ta'zir.

Hadd means prevention and is the uppermost punishment allowed for some specific crimes, which are: murder, theft, adultery and fornication, unsubstantiated accusations of adultery, drunkenness, brigandage and rebellion.  Each of these crimes have been mentioned in the sacred texts explicitly with prescribed punishments and burdens of proof.  For example theft has the uppermost punishment of severing of the hand and requires that a sane adult with intent to steal covertly takes an item of substantial value from behind a locked door that was witnessed by two upright people.  Failure to meet the defined criteria satisfactorily results in the uppermost punishment (hadd) being lifted and the lesser discretionary punishment (ta’zir) being applied if the defendant is found guilty.

The judge is obliged to look for doubt in order to lessen the sentence: "Prevent the application of hadd punishments because of ambiguity" (Ibn Adi narrated by Ibn Abbas).  Islamic Criminal Law's appearance of severity is understood to deter and raise awareness of God's distaste for those crimes but its application of mercy is to suppress criminality rather than enact retribution; severely punishing only the most flagrant disregards of the law.  “That some fixed penalties were not or only rarely enforced does not mean that the provisions of the law of hadd offences had become obsolete, but only that these provisions were so strictly applied that the conditions for a conviction were rarely met” (Peters, 2005, pp 75).

Peters R, 2005, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law, Cambridge University Press, New York USA

Further reading: Kamali M H, 2006, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic Test Society, Cambridge UK

Healing the breasts of the believer

The name ISIS give the video comes from a Qur’anic verse, which reads:

{Fight them: God will punish them at your hands, He will disgrace them, He will help you to conquer them, He will heal the believers’ feelings}[9:14]

It is beyond the scope of this post to go into the details of jihad (see:Kelsay, 2007), however this verse has no general meaning and no legal application since it relates to the specific historical event of the Covenant of Hudaybiyyah (628 CE) signed between the fledgling community of Medinah with the pagan Mekkans (mushriku l-`arab): {with whom you made a treaty at the Sacred Mosque} [9:7]. The pagan Arabs had broken the covenant of peace {they respect no tie of kinship or treaty. They are the ones who are committing aggression} [9:10] {who attacked you first} [9:13], despite the pagans’ continuous deceit the early Muslim community was still asked to forgive them should they join them {then they are your brothers in faith} [9:11]. The Muslims are reminded of the pagan’s treachery exhorting them to rise up despite their fears {Do you fear them? It is God you should fear} [9:13] and God will enact Divine punishment {at your hand} [9:14] rather through a miracle such as the Earth swallowing them up etc. and then God will personally sooth their hearts removing the anguish of years of tyranny inflicted by the pagans. The objective of jihad is given previously {so that they may stop} [9:12] not for vengeance, so the whole affair was for the community’s betterment to remain steadfast and to purify their intention for God alone and not revenge (see: Usmani, 2006,vol 4, pp 320-323).

ISIS imply that their action of ‘retaliation’ is soothing; a soothing through vengeance.  This completely inverts the collection of verses since the soothing is due to their patience and steadfastness, it is a lesson to inspire faith, similar to other verses such as: {So truly where there is hardship there is also ease} [94:5].

Kelsay J, 2007, Arguing the Just War in Islam, Harvard Uniersity Press, USA

Usmani M S, 2006, Ma’ariful Qur’an, Maktaba e DarulUloom, Karachi

Ibn Taymiyyah

At the end of the video the 14^th century reformer ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) is quoted:

If in public exemplary punishment (tamthil) there is a call to [the unbelievers] to believe or a deterrence for them from hostility, then it is here [a matter of] carrying out the prescribed punishments and legal jihad.

Tamthil is a general word coming from the root m-th-l and means mutilate, maim, punishment and retribution, it has no direct connection with immolation.  The argument ibn Taymiyyah is making is a pragmatic one; in war time Muslims may retaliate publically as a deterrence for further hostility, such as executing captives at the gates of a besieged town to coerce the city to capitulate and thus end further loss of life.  He is not saying it is a religious obligation, nor is he promoting vengeance or retaliation, rather he is re-emphasising the objective of jihad to stop further hostility (see 9:12 above).

ISIS have used ibn Taymiyyah to try and give credibility to their actions, but the dramatised horror video of vengeance cannot qualify as the stratagem of war that ibn Taymiyyah alludes especially with Jordan’s avowed retaliation of ‘grave consequences’ should Al-Kaseasbeh be harmed (see here).

The Hanafis and Shafi’i’s have permitted it

ISIS claim that two of the classical schools of Islamic Jurisprudence have permitted immolation as a mode of punishment. However, ISIS have grossly misrepresented classical scholarship to try and legitimise their actions as part of Islamic Law.

The Hanafi and Shafi’I Schools consider immolation as impermissible, for example the only method of execution permitted in the Hanafi School is with a blade (see below).  What both Schools do permit, however, is during a war Muslims may attack with fire and projectiles.

I [al-Shaybani] asked: ‘would it be permissible to inundate a city in the territory of war with water, to burn it with fire, or to attack [its people] with mangonels (a type of catapult) even though there may be slaves, women, old people and children in it?  He [Abu Hanifa, namesake of the Hanafi School] replied: ‘Yes, I would approve of doing all of them.’ I asked: ‘Would the same be true if people have among them Muslim prisoners of war or Muslim merchants?’ He replied: ‘Yes, even if they had among them [Muslims], there would be no harm to do all of that to them.’ I asked: ‘Why?’ He replied: ‘If Muslims stopped attacking the inhabitants of the territory of war for any of the reasons that you have stated, they would be unable to go to war at all, for there is no city in the territory of war in which there is no one at all of these you have mentioned. (Shaybani’s Siyar, 1966, pp 101-102)

The student, al-Shaybani (d. 805 CE), is asking whether what is normally morally objectionable can be permitted in war, his teacher Abu Hanifa (d. 767 CE), answers in the affirmative due to it being the lesser of two evils. What should be noted here is that Abu Hanifa (the Shafi’is concur) permits attacking the building with fire due to a need, which may regrettably lead to loss of non-combatant life, but the people are not purposefully attacked with fire for this is impermissible.

Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) in his work Bidayat al Mujtahid, a book to prepare a jurist for independent reasoning, writes:

The proscription of mutilating the bodies of the enemy is fully established.  The Muslim jurists agree on the permissibility of slaying them with weapons, but disagree about burning with fire. A group of jurists disallowed burning them with fire or even attacking them with it, and this is the opinion of ‘Umar (the second caliph) and is also narrated from Malik (namesake of the Maliki Law School). Sufyan al Thawri permitted this, whilst some said: ‘if the enemy initiates this it is permitted, otherwise not.

The reason for their disagreement stems from the conflict of a general implication with a specific meaning. The generality lies in the words of the Exalted, {slay them wherever you find them}[4:89]. This does not make an exception for any kind of slaying. The specific implication was established when the Prophet (pbuh), said about a man, ‘If you find so-and-so, kill him, and do not burn him, for no one punishes with fire except the Lord of the fire.’ (Abu Dawud, No. 2673),’ (ibn Rushd, vol 1, pp 460).

Ibn Rushd is academically encompassing all of Sunni thought on this point.  The overwhelming majority of scholars including the Four Orthodox Schools of Sunni Islam, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali (for which ibn Taymiyyah is a student), all consider the deliberate use of fire against humans and animals, both in war time or peace, as forbidden. However a minority permitted it such as al Thawri, (d. 778) namesake of the now extinct Thawri School, although he only meant on the battlefield, since he views killing captives as impermissible; taking the general meaning of: {and once they are defeated, bind any captives firmly––later you can release them by grace or by ransom––until the toils of war have ended} [47:4] to be definitive (al-Qurtubi, 16:227). Ibn Rushd likewise records earlier a consensus (ijma’) of the companions against executing prisoners of war (Vol 1, pp. 456).  Al Thawri is making a jurisprudential argument that the generality of the verse interprets any specificity from the hadith (narrations), this is an approach to interpretation, which if applied would have to be consistently applied thus rendering ISIS’s actions completely beyond any form of coherent interpretation.

Directly burning combatant enemies during war time is forbidden (haram) or at the very best very doubtful (shubuhat), such that any religiously scrupulous person (wara’) would avoid it; “he who guards against doubtful things keeps his religion and honour blameless, and he who indulges in doubtful things indulges in fact in unlawful things” [Muslim, No 1599]. If taken as permissible it could never be applied to captives because that approach to interpretation would contradict it.  Islamic Law cannot be considered to be characterised as using burning as a punishment.  Whilst it may be argued at the extreme end that burning enemy soldiers is not punishable in the hereafter it is unanimously considered morally wrong. ISIS, who claim to implement Islam, have made no attempt to represent Islamic Law or Islam and have taken shubuhat and contradictory decisions to implement viciousness and cruelty.

Al-Shaybani M trans. Khadduri M, 1966, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’sSiyar, John Hopkins University Press, USA.

Ibn Rushd, trans. Nyazee I A K, 1996, The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer, Garnet Publication Ltd, Reading UK

Al Muhallab said: ‘this is not an absolute prohibition, but rather on the path of humility.’

The well known (mashhur) hadith ‘no one punishes with fire except the Lord of the fire’ is explained away by quoting an early theologian Al-Muhallab as recorded by Ibn Hajar (d. 1449), whose position is augmented with reports of the Prophet putting out the eyes of the ‘Uraynians with heated iron rods and some of the companions burning people during their respective reigns as caliph.

Al-Muhallab as a theologian during the initial phase of the Sunni / Shia split, he is not setting legal precedent, but defending the Sunni theological position that the caliphate of Abu Bakr was valid, did not usurp the throne from ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, and he was free of corruption.  But even so these ahad (single) reports (khabar) of Abu Bakr’s alleged burning of Iyas bin Abdullah bin Abd Yalil for treachery are unanimously rejected by Sunni jurists, for example ibn Hajar in Lisan al-Mizan, the same scholar who records Al-Muhallab’s statement, records one of the narrators in the chain of transmission (isnad) as discredited (munkar). Likewise the reports of the companion Khalid ibn Walid’s alleged burning of Khalid ibn Nuwayra are considered equally fabricated; ibn Hibban (d. 965) considering a narrator a ‘liar’ (see here). Not mentioned by ISIS is the incident of the fourth caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib allegedly burning members of the fanatical Saba’iyyah, which also on closer inspection have no application in Islamic Law (see here). Whether these ahad (single) reports actually qualify as historical events is highly dubious and they certainly have no credibility in Islamic Law, but perhaps what is most telling is that ISIS are using these narrations commonly found in Shia polemics to justify their anti-Shia violence!?

The ‘Urayna incident is also considered a political invention, most likely by the hugely unpopular Ummayyad’s (651-750 CE) to justify their pre-Islamic style violence upon their foes. Of the conflicting reports, one such, is that recorded by Ibn Kathir in his commentary of 5:33-34 (here); the tribe of ‘Urayna came in poor health seeking a cure and so were sent with provisions to an area outside of Madinah with a shepherd boy. The ‘Urayna tortured the boy by putting thorns in his eyes, crucified him and stole the provisions. After the bandits were seized they had limbs amputated, were blinded and were crucified. Of those scholars that have entertained the reports, their explanations have differed: some said 5:33-34 was revealed to abrogate the Prophet’s retaliation with the proper punishment or reprimanded him for using mutilation (muthla), something prohibited in Islam, or the ‘Urayna were blinded only as retaliation (qisas – see below) or that he had intended to retaliate but refrained when 5:33-34 was revealed (el Fadl, 2006, see ‘The Hiraba Verse’).

ISIS’s use of the ‘Urayna incident and 5:33-34 implies they considered the pilot a muharib (bandit). Harabah (for which muharib derives) linguistically means to quarrel and to fight, in Islamic Law it technically means to openly take away property with the threat of force and includes crimes such as: highway robbery, pillaging, high treason and banditry.  The verses outlines the prescribed four punishments for a muharib: execution, crucifixion for which they mean execute and leave hung up ignominiously, cross amputation of a foot and hand, and banishment. The Malikis said the prescribed punishment is at the judge’s discretion, whilst the other schools gave each specific crime a specific punishment; the murderer and looter is crucified, the murderer only is executed, the looter receives cross amputation and a bandit that did neither is imprisoned or banished. The burden of proof for which is either confession or two upright witnesses who were not the victims (Anwarullah, 2006).  Clearly the pilot does not qualify as a muharib for he was not an outlaw in a tribe of bandits that lived outside the city raiding the inhabitants, nor did he receive the prescribed punishment and most likely did not receive the prerequisite trial and the due process of law. As such, the ‘Urayna incident is then proof against ISIS, if we accept the narrations as historically accurate, since it has been recorded as a criticism for not following the Law. In fact the ones guilty of harabah in the eyes of Islamic Law are ISIS themselves (see here)!

El Fadl, K A, 2006, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law, Cambridge University Press, UK

Anwarullah, 2006, The Criminal Law of Islam, Kitab Bhavan, India

Burning in retaliation

The video is edited such that the pilot’s burning is cut with shots of the victims of Jordanian airstrikes. The implied meaning is that the burning of the pilot and his subsequent burial under rubble is retaliation, known as qisas.

The general rules of qisas (retaliation) is outlined in the verse {Let harm be requited by an equal harm, though anyone who forgives and puts things right will have his reward from God Himself––He does not like those who do wrong} [42:40] and [2:178].  It is similar in characteristic to the Biblical ‘an eye for an eye’ (Exodus 21:23-25, Matthew 5:38) which permits retaliation through the legal process of law (see 17:33), but includes the additional caveat that forgiveness is considered preferable.  In addition the verse has used the same word (sayyi’ah) for both the crime and its punishment implying retaliation is a wrong, but the lesser of two evils.

Punishments for homicide include: retaliation (qisas) by execution, discretionary punishment (ta’zir), blood money (diya) or pardon (‘afw) and these depend on the nature of the homicide; whether intentional murder, unintentional homicide by intentional bodily harm or accidental homicide and the additionally includes the decision of the victims heirs.  The burden of proof may take place when the one who gave the killer blow is proven without doubt to have intentionally killed the victim through confession or by the testimony of two upright witnesses seeing the murder take place, any doubt removes the death penalty although the defendant may still be liable for the lesser punishments depending on the details.

The manner of execution in the Hanafi and Hanbali Schools is only with a blade: “there is no retaliation except with the sword” [Ibn Maja no. 2668] because the loss of life is re-paid with loss of life not the manner in which the murder was committed.  The Maliki and Shafi’i Schools use 16:126 and 2:194 to justify that execution takes the mode of the murder except if it would cause ‘protracted torture’ and then a blade is used (Peters, 2005, p 37).  Burning therefore is not permitted in qisas (retaliation) cases amongst the Four Orthodox Schools of Islamic Law contradicting the claims of ISIS. Ibn Hazm (d. 1064), of the now extinct Dhahiri School, however in Al Mullah does identify burning to death as the retaliation (qisas) for intentionally burning a victim to death, taking the generality of the verses to retaliate without limit. However, the practicalities of requiring the exact replication of the mode of murder is just one example of why the Dhahiri School was criticised and fell out of favour.

The case of the Jordanian pilot could not be identified as qisas since it is for murder cases within a state during peace time and not during war, which is what ISIS claim.  Even if we hypothetically assume it was, then retaliation by execution could not be carried out since there would be too many doubts as to whether the pilot actually premeditatedly intended to kill those people (whom he’d never met) especially using projectile weapons since their result is probabilistic unlike a sword to the heart etc.

During war time proportionate responses are permitted, although it is expressly described as better to avoid the cycle of retaliation:

If you [believers] have to respond to an attack, make your response proportionate, but it is best to stand fast.[16:126]

As Suyuti (d. 1505) in his commentary, Al Jalalayn, of the verse writes:

After Hamza [b. ‘Abd al-Muttalib] had been killed and mutilated, and the Prophet (s) had seen him and said, ‘Verily I will mutilate 70 of them for you’, the following was revealed: And if you retaliate, retaliate with the like of what you have been made to suffer; and yet if you endure patiently, [refraining] from revenge, verily that, namely, [that] enduring, is better for the patient. Thus the Prophet (s) refrained [from taking revenge] and made atonement for his oath, as reported by al-Bazzar.

This relates to armed conflict only and not captives, as stated above the permissibility of executing captives is highly contentious in Islamic Law and the burning of which is absolutely prohibited.  The verse used as justification for, proves to be justification against; Islamic Law is built on fair justice and is augmented with mercy and forgiveness.  ISIS’s actions show they are quick to seek revenge using the most brutal and vicious methods even if contrary to Islamic Law.

Peters R, 2005, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law, Cambridge University Press, New York USA

Further reading: Ibn Rushd, trans. Nyazee I A K, 1996, The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer, Garnet Publication Ltd, Reading UK, especially Vol 2 pp 478-521

Conclusion

ISIS claim they are an Islamic State and so presumably are subject to Islamic Law and manifest a form of Islam, albeit an extreme one. However, just from the evidence presented here ISIS are in complete contradiction of both. Summarising the errors of ISIS’s video and al Eftaa wa al-Buhuth’s reasoning, they have: applied specific verses generally and anachronistically used mushrikiu al 'Arab (pagan Arabs of 7^th Cent.) incorrectly to apply to anyone; inverted the meaning of Qur’anic verses by referring to them in isolation; misrepresented ibn Taymiyyah and the Hanafi and Shafi’i Schools respectively to justify the immolation of prisoners of war for which all consider prohibited (haram); used apocryphal tales of caliphs and sectarian polemics as sources of law yet both have no authority and are in express contradiction to that which is clear and authoritative; and mix up the punishments and alleged crimes of Islamic Law.  ISIS have not only misrepresented and broken Islamic Law, but work on a completely counter principle to Islam itself; cruelty and harshness over patience, steadfastness and mercy.

Some commentators, such as ‘What ISIS Really Wants’ by G Wood (here), have claimed that whilst ISIS manifests an extreme form it ‘is, however, a form of Islam that the literal-minded would not instantly find hypocritical, or blasphemously purged of its inconveniences.’ The ‘genius’ of ISIS is they bypass the complex intellectual endeavours of Islamic scholarship and instead tell stories to capture the imagination of the disaffected youth.  All the clear authoritative evidence against them can be bypassed with spurious tales of important figures from brutal periods in Islamic history.  In a similar model to the French Revolution, ISIS have legitimised the murder of innocent civilians for a righteous purpose; as the anthropologist S Atran said: ‘you can’t inspire people to kill and harm others without moral virtue’.  Circumstance is the inspiration for ISIS’s violence, Islam is simply the unfortunate ideological bystander that is prevalent in the region.

The founder of ISIS Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (d. 2006) was a school dropout who embarked on a life of crime after his father died.  Having been introduced to extreme puritanical takfiri Wahhabism (see here for details) he joined the Afghanis to thwart the advancement of the Soviet Red Army. Worsening relations between his homeland, Jordan, and Israel saw an influx of black market arms from the first Gulf war and saw him join groups that conducted suicide bombings in ‘Zionist’ territories.  Arrested as a terrorist, like the current ‘Amir’ al Baghdadi, Zarqawi used intimidation and corruption during incarceration to create and grow his faction, taking the title Amir (prince). He served only a fraction of the sentence with a regime change being released in March 1999.  Pledging his faction’s allegiance to Al Qaeda and moving to Iraq, he made full use of the Iraqi insurgency during the second Gulf War to form the ‘Islamic State of Iraq’ in 2006, which later became known as ISIS (Weiss, 2015).

ISIS are the product of social problems such as high unemployment and political instability, were hardened with stints in high security prison and war, and have proven potent due to black market arms and financial backing from, most likely although speculative, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Islam’s link with ISIS is as tenuous as a link with the Arabic language, since there would still be rape, violence and usurpation of property and land irrespective of the existence of both.  ISIS is just another political separatist group amongst the many that reign terror on humanity.  However, by trying to legitimise their actions using Islam they have rendered their endeavours illegitimate.  Islam and Islamic Law pose as their biggest foe and the greatest source of hope to bring their reign of tyranny to an abrupt end.

Weiss M & Hassan H, 2015, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, Regan Arts, New York

Sunni Muslims unanimously condemn ISIS